Defense Against Shortest Path Attacks

Identifying shortest paths between nodes in a network is a common graph analysis problem that is important for many applications involving routing of resources. An adversary that can manipulate the graph structure could alter traffic patterns to gain some benefit (e.g., make more money by directing traffic to a toll road). This presentation considers a recently published attack in which an adversary removes edges from a graph to make a particular path the shortest between its terminal nodes. We develop a defense against such attacks by modifying the weights of the graph that users observe. The defender must balance inhibiting the attacker against any negative effects of the defense on benign users. Specifically, the defender’s goals are: (a) to recommend the shortest paths possible to users, (b) for the lengths of the shortest paths in the published graph to be close to those of the same paths in the true graph, and (c) to minimize the probability of an attack. We formulate the defense as a Stackelberg game in which the defender is the leader and the attacker is the follower. In this context, we also consider a zero-sum version of the game, in which the defender’s goal is to minimize cost while achieving the minimum possible attack probability. We show that this problem is NP-hard and propose heuristic solutions based on increasing edge weights along target paths in both the zero-sum and non-zero-sum settings. We present defense results with both synthetic and real network datasets and show that these methods often reach the lower bound of the defender’s cost. Speaker(s): Dr. Benjamin Miller, Virtual: https://events.vtools.ieee.org/m/374165